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Should the FTC Kill the Password? The Case for Better Authentication
BY DANIEL J. SOLOVE AND WOODROW HARTZOG
Introduction
W e are in a data security crisis, with data securitybreaches occurring at a staggering rate. A majorpart of the reason involves problems authenti-
cating the identity of account holders. The most com-
mon approach to authentication is the use of pass-
words, but it is increasingly clear that passwords are
being used incorrectly in ways that make them a weak
security mechanism.1 People select poor passwords, re-
use them on many sites and have difficulty remember-
ing them.2 These behaviors are understandable given
the fact that authentication is needed on so many sites
and systems—there are too many passwords for even
those with the best memories to remember. And hack-
ers and phishers can readily trick people into revealing
their passwords, and even the passwords of even the
most responsible users are vulnerable to malware.3
There is widespread consensus about the problems
with passwords.4 Few would defend passwords alone as
a good means of authentication for accessing important
data. Moreover, there are alternative authentication
techniques that can enhance or replace passwords. For
example, two-factor authentication is hailed by experts
as a big improvement over using passwords alone to au-
thenticate identity.5 Verizon’s latest data breach inves-
tigation report estimated that two-factor authentication
would be the recommended strategy to protect against
24 percent of the reported breaches in 2014.6
Despite widespread consensus that password authen-
tication is weak, and despite widespread availability
and the reasonable cost of alternative or additional
methods of authentication, the most common practice
remains using passwords alone to authenticate. For ex-
1 J. Bonneau, et al., The Quest to Replace Passwords: A
Framework for Comparative Evaluation of Web Authentica-
tion Schemes, 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
(SP), 553, 567 (May 20-23, 2012).
2 R. Morris & K. Thompson, Password Security: A Case His-
tory, Comm. ACM vol. 22, no. 11, 594-97 (1979); A. Adams &
M. , Users Are Not the Enemy, Comm. ACM vol. 42, no. 12,
41-46 (1999); C. Herley & P.C. van Oorschot, A Research
Agenda Acknowledging the Persistence of Passwords, IEEE
Security & Privacy, vol. 10, no. 1, 28–36 (2012); Blase Ur, et al.,
Helping Users Create Better Passwords, USENIX ;login:, vol.
37, no. 6, 51-57 (Dec. 2012).
3 G. Aaron & R. Rasmussen, Global Phishing Survey:
Trends and Domain Name Use in 1H2014, Trends and Domain
Name Use (2014), available at http://docs.apwg.org/reports/
APWG_Global_Phishing_Report_1H_2014.pdf.
4 Bonneau, et al., supra note 1 (‘‘The continued domination
of passwords over all other methods of end-user authentica-
tion is a major embarrassment to security researchers. . . .
Over forty years of research have demonstrated that pass-
words are plagued by security problems and openly hated by
users.’’).
5 E. Grosse & M. Upadhyay, , Security & Privacy, IEEE , vol.
11, no. 1, 15, 22 (Jan.-Feb. 2013).
6 Verizon, 2015 Data Breach Investigation Report (‘‘The use
of two-factor authentication for web applications—even by
customers—will go a long way toward keeping your organiza-
tion from being used and abused.’’).
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ample, businesses have been slow to adopt two-factor
authentication,7 and those that do adopt it sometimes
do not encourage users to take advantage of it.8
The current state of affairs thus demonstrates
pathology—rather widespread consensus that an exist-
ing security practice is poor yet a lack of movement to-
ward available alternatives. We contend that situations
such as this one justify regulatory intervention.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is well-
positioned to make this move. It has been enforcing pri-
vacy and data security for over 15 years. But to do so,
the agency must further develop its nascent theory of
authentication requirements. The FTC has been enforc-
ing privacy and data security under a variety of laws
and treaties, such as Section 5 of the FTC Act, the Chil-
dren’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB Act) and the U.S.-EU
Safe Harbor arrangement, among others. Regarding
data security, the FTC has generally focused on
whether an entity’s data security protections are ‘‘rea-
sonable.’’
Although the FTC has filed complaints against com-
panies that have unreasonable password practices, the
agency has not brought any enforcement action con-
tending that the use of passwords alone for authentica-
tion is unreasonable.9 In this essay, we argue that the
FTC should do so. An updated theory of reasonable au-
thentication is one of the best ways the FTC could act to
improve data security. But requiring improved authen-
tication would be a bold step for the FTC, more aggres-
sive than the steps it normally takes. The agency has
generally been quite conservative in the practices it
deems to be unfair, choosing to enforce against egre-
giously bad practices.
In this essay we argue that in certain circumstances,
the FTC should start requiring better methods of au-
thentication than mere passwords. The FTC has already
laid the groundwork for such an approach and need
only expand upon its theories requiring companies to
be responsive to both online and offline attempts to
compromise the integrity of user accounts. If the FTC is
going to be a relevant player in the realm of data secu-
rity, it must address flawed security measures even
though they might be commonly used.
The Challenge of Authentication and the
Failures of the Password
Authentication presents one of the greatest security
challenges organizations face. How do we accurately
ensure that people seeking access to accounts or data
are actually whom they say they are? People need to be
able to access accounts and data conveniently, and ac-
cess must often be provided remotely, without being
able to see or hear the person seeking access.
The predominant method of authentication thus far
has been the password. People memorize a word,
phrase or code, and they demonstrate that they are in-
deed entitled to access by providing this word or code.
The advantage of passwords is that they are easy to de-
ploy. Unlike physical items, passwords don’t cost any-
thing to create. People don’t need to carry around any-
thing such as token generators or keys. Items can read-
ily get lost or misplaced, but passwords can stay with
people wherever they go—provided, of course, that they
are not forgotten. When a password is compromised,
the password can readily be changed.
Unfortunately, passwords have some significant
shortcomings—they depend upon human memory,
which is limited. Short and simple passwords are easy
to remember, but they are also easy to crack. So pass-
words need to be long and complex as well as easy to
remember, and this combination is incredibly hard to
achieve.
Making the problem even worse, people are told that
all of their passwords should be unique. Password reuse
dramatically increases peoples’ vulnerability when their
password is compromised.10 But it is a virtually impos-
sible feat required of human memory to remember
many long and complex passwords.
According to one study, consumers have an average
of 24 online accounts.11 For those who use the Internet
more robustly, the number of accounts is much
higher—accounts for health insurance sites, bank sites,
investment company sites, credit card company sites,
utility company sites, news sites, entertainment sites,
social media sites and merchant sites, among many oth-
ers. Then there are logins associated with one’s place of
employment and logins for devices like smartphones
and laptops. The number of accounts that people have
can be staggering.
To make matters worse, people cannot just use dic-
tionary words or names, as these can be cracked too
easily.12 The mainstream advice on creating passwords
counsels people to use special characters, numbers,
punctuation and upper and lower case. All these add
complexity to passwords, but they also make passwords
significantly harder to memorize.
These demands have resulted in users being given
the Herculean task of creating a unique, complex pass-
word for every account. No one can remember all of
these passwords, so people ignore the advice about us-
ing unique passwords and reuse the same password or
draw from a pool of a few passwords. According to a
study, 73 percent of accounts use duplicate passwords,
and consumers use on average of only 1 unique pass-
word per every 4 accounts.13
But common approaches to authentication make
even more unreasonable demands on human memory.
Impossible isn’t enough, so it must be multiplied by an-
7 See John Fontana, Two Factor Authentication in Two
Years, ZDNet, Apr. 3, 2013, http://www.zdnet.com/article/two-
factor-authentication-in-two-years/.
8 Google has a very useful website for enabling its two fac-
tor authentication mechanism, but not all users see it. See
Google Inc., 2-Step Verification, http://www.google.com/
landing/2step/.
9 See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and
the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 583
(2014).
10 See, e.g., Anupam Das, et al., The Tangled Web of Pass-
word Reuse, NDSS ’14, 23-26 (Feb. 2014), available at http://
www.jbonneau.com/doc/DBCBW14-NDSS-tangled_web.pdf;
Matt Honan, How Apple and Amazon Security Flaws Led to
My Epic Hacking, Wired Aug. 6, 2012, available at http://
www.wired.com/2012/08/apple-amazon-mat-honan-hacking/.
11 TeleSign Corp., TeleSign Consumer Account Security
Report (June 3, 2015), available at https://www.telesign.com/
resources/whitepapers/telesign-consumer-account-security-
report/.
12 Bruce Schneier, Choosing Secure Passwords, Schneier
on Security (Mar. 3, 2014), https://www.schneier.com/blog/
archives/2014/03/choosing_secure_1.html.
13 TeleSign Corp., supra note 11.
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other impossible feat: Many companies want passwords
to be changed frequently. So people must not only re-
member potentially hundreds of long and complex
passwords but also must change these passwords fre-
quently. Unsurprisingly, people often don’t change
their passwords. Indeed, nearly half of consumers have
a password they haven’t changed in more than five
years.14
The more challenging it becomes to memorize all the
passwords, the more likely people are to write the pass-
words down in convenient locations, thus creating ad-
ditional security risks. Passwords find their way onto
sticky notes near computers or in wallets or in e-mail or
listed in text files in devices.
There are technical attempts to help people, such as
systems that forbid people from choosing weak pass-
words.15 Some systems force people to change their
password every month or every few months. But these
measures fail to help people remember passwords.
They cannot stop people from reusing the same pass-
words or from writing down the passwords.
One company marketed a product called Password
Minder and produced a hilarious infomercial that says
that Password Minder has been designed to ‘‘safely
store passwords.’’16 It touts: ‘‘Never lose a password.
Guaranteed!’’ Password Minder ‘‘features a discreet
leatherette-bound cover to ensure your passwords stay
a secret.’’ The product was ‘‘laughed out of production’’
as experts relentlessly mocked it.17 But other similar
products remain on the market, such as The Personal
Internet Address & Password Log Book, a small tabbed
book where people can write down all their login cre-
dentials.18 It is actually the bestselling book in Amazon-
.com Inc.’s Internet and Telecommunications cat-
egory.19 There are several other password log books for
sale on Amazon.
These solutions will make any security expert
chuckle, but laughter is misguided if directed to the
people who would use such a product—instead, the
laughter should be at the fact that people feel the need
to resort to such a means because of impossible de-
mands being made on human cognition.
Another strategy to help people with passwords is to
store them electronically in one account. This is much
more sophisticated than writing them down on paper,
because the account can be secured. But how is it
secured? Ironically, often with a password! So if the
password to this account is compromised, fraudsters
can gain access to all of a person’s passwords.
Locking the Front Door But Leaving the
Back Door Open
The use of passwords and the advice to use unique
ones for each account, to make them long and complex,
is designed with a particular set of threats in mind. One
such threat is a fraudster simply guessing a person’s
password. Many passwords are so weak that they can
readily be guessed. Here is a list of the 10 most com-
monly used passwords:
1. 123456
2. password
3. 12345
4. 12345678
5. Qwerty
6. 123456789
7. 1234
8. baseball
9. dragon
10. football20
Often, passwords are compromised offline, away
from the login portal. Hackers can use a brute force at-
tack, technology that allows them to try millions of
passwords in a short time. Long, complex and unique
passwords are designed to prevent these kinds of at-
tacks, and they do succeed somewhat in stopping them.
But there are other kinds of attacks where having
long, complex or unique passwords won’t help. For ex-
ample, in a phishing attack, fraudsters try to trick users
into giving away their passwords. Often, fake websites
and deceptive hyperlinks look very real and easily de-
ceive many users. As another example, malware such
as keystroke loggers and other spyware can be used to
obtain passwords, which seems to be how health in-
surer Anthem Inc. was breached last year.21 Even when
users act perfectly in adopting complex, unique pass-
words and avoid accidental disclosure, malware can
still compromise username and password credentials.
Complex passwords and limits on login attempts do
not protect against offline attacks, phishing or malware.
Even the person with the world’s longest and most com-
plex password will be defeated if she turns over her
password to a phisher.
The current approach to passwords protects against
only certain types of attacks and fails to address other
threats.22 And by asking people to do the impossible by
14 Id.
15 Blase Ur, et al., supra note 2, at 51-57.
16 YouTube, Password Minder Infomercial, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=sgbRbYlojm8. More information
about the information is available here: Paul Lucas, Password
Minder Uses the Cutting Edge Technology of Paper to Keep
You Safe, Infomercial Hell (Mar. 11, 2013), http://
www.infomercial-hell.com/blog/2013/03/11/password-minder/.
17 Casey Johnson, Password Minder: The Blank Notebook
that Got Laughed Out of Production, Ars Technica May 16,
2013, http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2013/05/password-
minder-the-blank-notebook-that-got-laughed-out-of-
production/.
18 Amazon.com Inc., Personal Internet Address & Password
Book, http://www.amazon.com/Personal-Internet-Address-
Password-Book/dp/1441303251.
19 Amazon.com Inc., Best Sellers in Internet & Telecommu-
nications, http://www.amazon.com/gp/bestsellers/books/3705/
ref=pd_zg_hrsr_b_1_4_last (last visited July 23, 2015).
20 Jamie Condliffe, The 25 Most Popular Passwords of 2014:
We’re All Doomed, Gizmodo, Jan. 20, 2015, http://
gizmodo.com/the-25-most-popular-passwords-of-2014-were-
all-doomed-1680596951.
21 See Brian Krebs, Anthem Breach May Have Started in
April 2014, Krebs on Security (Feb. 15, 2015), http://
krebsonsecurity.com/2015/02/anthem-breach-may-have-
started-in-april-2014/ (14 PVLR 227, 2/9/15).
22 See, e.g., David Thaw, Cybersecurity Stovepiping (May
10, 2015) (work-in-progress), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2572012.
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creating passwords that are both unique and compli-
cated, this approach practically forces people to engage
in risky behaviors that defeat the purpose of these pro-
tections.
Hardly any expert would disagree with the problems
we stated above, yet passwords remain the predomi-
nant approach to authentication. We are living in a
world of ostriches, their chuckles at the absurdity of the
situation muffled by the sand above their heads.
Why Aren’t Better Authentication
Methods Catching on More Widely?
The problems that strong passwords protect against,
such as guessing attacks, can be dealt with through
technologies that limit the number of unsuccessful
login attempts within a particular period of time. If
guessing attacks can be limited in this way, then the
cost-benefit analysis of using long and complex pass-
words changes. However, the threat of offline attacks
and phishing must also be addressed to make authenti-
cation effective.
There are other solutions to authentication problems
and methods of authentication that can be used if orga-
nizations move away from their futile clinging to pass-
words. Many relatively cheap and easy-to-deploy meth-
ods can be used to protect against different kinds of at-
tacks on credentials. One such example is two-factor
authentication.23 The essence of two-factor authentica-
tion is simple. In order to log in, you must have some-
thing you know (usually a password), as well as one ad-
ditional factor, usually something you have (usually
your cellphone) or something you are (usually a finger-
print or faceprint). Sometimes two factors are only re-
quired initially as a way to authenticate certain devices.
But these systems can also require two factors for every
login attempt. USB tokens that rely upon robust cryp-
tography are more expensive and harder to use and de-
ploy, though they provide robust protection, particu-
larly when layered on top of each other and combined
with server-side protections like hashing and salting
passwords and monitoring login activity for abnormal
behavior.24
Two-factor authentication is particularly promising
to factor into a company’s authentication calculus be-
cause it has already been deployed by major compa-
nies, protects against many different kinds of offline at-
tacks and can leverage a technology that most people
already constantly carry around—their cellphone.25
Two-factor authentication is a good way to protect
against both online and offline attacks. While two-
factor authentication remains vulnerable to specialized
phishing and malware-based attacks, those vulnerabili-
ties are relatively narrow and typically require the
fraudster to already have the user’s user name and
password.26
The multi-factor approach to authentication can also
be adapted and made as strong as necessary. Compa-
nies could require three authentication factors in some
contexts. As a measure of last resort, some companies
and researchers have even proposed a fourth authenti-
cation factor, ‘‘someone you know.’’27 Here, companies
would require that your friends ‘‘vouch’’ for you to con-
firm identity. Vouching could be an effective last resort
for authentication.28
Once implemented, two-factor authentication
schemes might even be upgraded to ‘‘two-channel au-
thentication’’ to protect against phishing and malware
attacks. In two-channel communication schemes, com-
panies will not authenticate users until they actually
hear back from them on the second channel (such as a
cellphone) dedicated to authentication.29
Of course, the same method of authentication need
not be used for all situations. The method of authenti-
cation should correspond to the degree of risk. This
means that for low-risk situations, passwords might
work well. But for high-risk situations, we need more
effective means of authentication. Elements affecting
risk include the sensitivity of the data, the damage that
can be caused by improper access to data, the likeli-
hood of improper access, and the costs of various meth-
ods of authentication in terms of money, time and con-
venience.
For example, two-factor authentication need not be
used for all transactions on the same account or device.
So two-factor authentication might be used when mak-
ing certain sensitive transactions, such as large pur-
chases, or accessing health or financial data.
By no means is everything about authentication well-
settled and agreed upon. For example, methods of au-
thentication involving biometrics maybe quite effective
and convenient at authenticating identity, but they
carry enormous risks if compromised because people
cannot change biometric data such as fingerprints or
eye scans.30 If a database of people’s fingerprint data
was obtained by hackers, people would have no ability
to fix the damage. Passwords have one leg up here be-
cause they readily can he changed.
Our point is not that there is a silver bullet that ad-
dresses all the problems with passwords. Rather, there
are many better authentication techniques available,
ones that are clearly a much better choice than pass-
words alone in certain situations, especially high-risk
situations.
Although many of these techniques are widely avail-
able and inexpensive, they are often not used. This is a
pathology that is undermining improved data security.
23 See, e.g., Emiliano De Cristofaro, A Comparative Usabil-
ity Study of Two-Factor Authentication, USEC ’14 (Feb. 23,
2014), available at http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/
files/01_5-paper.pdf.
24 See, e.g., Grosse & Upadhyay, supra note 5, at 15, 22.
25 See, e.g, De Cristofaro, supra note 20.
26 See Bruce Schneier, Two-Factor Authentication: Too
Little, Too Late, 48 Commc’ns of the ACM, Inside Risk (2004);
Jeff Goldman, New Spear Phishing Attack Bypasses Two Fac-
tor Authentication, eSecurity Planet, June 22, 2015, http://
www.esecurityplanet.com/network-security/new-spear-
phishing-attack-bypasses-two-factor-authentication.html.
27 See, e.g., John Brainard, et. al., Fourth-Factor Authenti-
cation: Someone You Know, CCS ’06 (Oct. 30–Nov. 3, 2006),
available at https://www.grc.com/sn/files/The_Fourth_
Factor.pdf; Stuart Schechter, et., al., It’s Not What You Know
But Who You Know: A Social Approach to Last Resort Authen-
tication, CHI 2009 (Apr. 4-9, 2009), available at http://
research.microsoft.com/pubs/79349/paper1459-schechter.pdf.
28 Id.
29 See Schneier, supra note 24.
30 See Daniel J. Solove, Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff
Between Privacy and Security 199-205 (2011); Chad Vander
Veen, Is It Time to Finally Get Rid of the Password?, Nextgov,
June 29, 2015, http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2015/06/
it-time-finally-get-rid-password/116485/.
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It is clear from many polls that most people are very
concerned about data security, and most leaders of or-
ganizations are also very concerned.31 It is also clear
that hardly any security experts would disagree with
much of our criticism of passwords.32 Why is the move-
ment away from passwords so slow? Organizations
should be dashing away.
Part of the explanation is likely due to plain old iner-
tia. Even sensible and cost-effective change can be dif-
ficult to do. The market doesn’t just race toward any im-
provement that is known to be better. Organizations of-
ten wait for others to act first. Until many organizations
start moving toward improved authentication and cre-
ate a lemming-like effect on other organizations, it is
easy for things to stagnate with the status quo.
What can organizations do better? In addition to
implementing two-factor authentication, they should
also ensure that users are educated about the technol-
ogy and prompted to choose whether to enable it. Two-
factor authentication does little good when users don’t
know about it or understand it.
Change is not likely to happen fast enough without
some kind of precipitating event, something to set
things in motion and eventually lead to a cascade. We
could wait for something like this to happen, but we
have no idea when it might occur. The status quo has
persisted for quite a while. So rather than wait for
Godot, there would be a great benefit for some kind of
regulatory intervention. Perhaps a nudge, maybe a
gentle push, maybe a shove and maybe even a kick in
the rear. Something needs to be done.
The FTC Has Laid the Groundwork for a
Better Approach to Authentication
In the U.S., the FTC is the regulatory agency in the
best position to step in and require improved authenti-
cation. The FTC has the broadest range of jurisdiction
of any federal agency enforcing data security. COPPA
gives the FTC jurisdiction over many websites that col-
lect data from children under the age of 13. The GLB
Act gives the FTC power to regulate the data security of
many types of financial institutions. Many companies
voluntarily submit to FTC jurisdiction under the U.S-EU
Safe Harbor arrangement, which has a principle for se-
curity: ‘‘Organizations must take reasonable precau-
tions to protect personal information from loss, misuse
and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and de-
struction.’’33
The broadest source of FTC jurisdiction is Section 5
of the FTC Act. Under Section 5, ‘‘unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby
declared unlawful.’’34 With the exception of a few in-
dustry carve-outs, Section 5 covers the vast majority of
companies doing business in the U.S.. The FTC has
long maintained that failing to provide adequate data
security can be a ‘‘deceptive’’ trade practice or an ‘‘un-
fair’’ trade practice—and in many cases, both deceptive
and unfair.
When determining whether data security is satisfac-
tory, the FTC essentially looks to whether the security
measures are ‘‘reasonable.’’ This is the explicit stan-
dard under the GLB Act35 and under Section 5.36
The FTC generally determines what is ‘‘reasonable’’
by looking to areas of widespread consensus. Such a
consensus appears to exist regarding passwords—at
least in what is being said, although it is not being done.
And the foundation exists in existing FTC jurispru-
dence to make a movement toward improved authenti-
cation.
The FTC recently issued authentication guidance to
businesses as part of its new data security education ini-
tiative.37 One of the FTC’s ‘‘10 practical lessons busi-
nesses can learn from the FTC’s 50+ data security
settlements’’ is that companies should ‘‘require secure
passwords and authentication.’’ According to the FTC,
this means that companies should: 1) insist on complex
and unique passwords; 2) store passwords securely; 3)
guard against brute force attacks; and 4) protect against
authentication bypass.38 Indeed, the FTC has been clear
in its complaints that authentication is a critical part of
the calculus for what constitutes reasonable data secu-
rity practices. In our previous article about the FTC’s
privacy jurisprudence, we noted that several FTC com-
plaints against companies for unfair and deceptive data
security practices faulted companies for poor user
name and password protocols, including allegations
that companies:
s used common/known passwords;
s did not require users to change passwords;
s failed to suspend users after repeated failed login
attempts;
31 Press Release, Am. Inst. of CPAs, AICPA Survey: One-in-
Four Americans Victimized by Information Security Breaches
(Apr. 21, 2015, http://www.aicpa.org/press/pressreleases/2015/
pages/aicpa-survey-one-in-four-americans-victimized-by-
information-security-breaches.aspx; Mary Madden, More On-
line Americans Say They’ve Experienced a Personal Data
Breach, Pew Research Center, Pew Research Center FAC-
TANK (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2014/04/14/more-online-americans-say-theyve-experienced-a-
personal-data-breach/; Ponemon Institute LLC, Is Your Com-
pany Ready for a Big Data Breach? The Second Annual Study
on Data Breach Preparedness (Sept. 2014), available at http://
www.experian.com/assets/data-breach/brochures/2014-
ponemon-2nd-annual-preparedness.pdf; Teri Robinson, The
2014 Survey: Guarding Against a Data Breach, available at
http://www.vormetric.com/sites/default/files/ar-SCMag-
DataBreachSurvey.pdf.
32 SeeVander Veen, supra note 28; Bonneau, et al., supra
note 1, at 553, 567; Morris &Thompson, supra note 2, at 594-
97; Adams & Sasse, supra note 2, at 41-46; Herley & van Oors-
chot, supra note 2, at 28–36; Blase Ur, et al., supra note 2, at
51-57.
33 Export.gov, U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, http://
www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476.asp (last up-
dated Dec. 18, 2013).
34 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
35 FTC, Final Rule—Standards for Safeguarding Customer
Information, 16 C.F.R. pt. 314.
36 FTC, Commission Statement Marking the FTC’s 50th
Data Security Settlement (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/cases/140131gmrstatement.pdf (‘‘The
touchstone of the Commission’s approach to data security is
reasonableness: a company’s data security measures must be
reasonable and appropriate in light of the sensitivity and vol-
ume of consumer information it holds, the size and complexity
of its business, and the cost of available tools to improve secu-
rity and reduce vulnerabilities.’’).
37 FTC, Start With Security: A Guide for Businesses (June
30, 2015), available at https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/
business-center/guidance/start-security-guide-business (14
PVLR 1236, 7/6/15).
38 Id.
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s allowed user name and password sharing;
s permitted users to store passwords in unsafe cook-
ies;
s failed to require user information such as pass-
words to be encrypted in transit; and
s allowed new user credentials to be created without
checking them against previously obtained legitimate
credentials.39
Like the FTC’s authentication guidance to busi-
nesses, these complaints are focused almost entirely on
passwords as a means of authentication. But a deeper
look reveals that the FTC has actually laid the ground-
work for a more complete theory of authentication. For
example, in targeting limitations on login attempts and
easy-to-guess passwords, the FTC is trying to protect
against online guessing attacks. In targeting password
sharing, failure to encrypt passwords in transit and
stale passwords, the FTC is trying to protect against the
many different ways passwords can be compromised
offline or away from the login page. The FTC has sig-
naled that companies should respond to authentication
requests in a reasonable way. As authentication threats
evolve, so should the FTC’s requirements for reason-
able authentication.
Should the FTC Start Requiring Improved
Authentication?
The recent wave of data breaches shows that indus-
try should be nudged so that standards can evolve. Im-
proved authentication is the ideal place for FTC inter-
vention because there is an increasing consensus from
industry and data security experts that passwords alone
are no longer sufficient for many kinds of users ac-
counts. Moreover, as described above, many new
identity-verification techniques like two-factor authenti-
cation are not radical concepts.
The FTC’s authentication jurisprudence supports
moving beyond passwords to embrace new, effective
and popular techniques. Although passwords alone
might still be sufficient for certain kinds of systems, the
FTC might consider where improved authentication ap-
proaches such as two-factor authentication might be
more appropriate for high-risk contexts.
The FTC should not create a one-size-fits-all stan-
dard. A holistic approach to authentication would con-
sider the relevant threats, the costs of deployment, the
toll on use and the relative security benefits of relevant
authentication strategies. The FTC can begin by holding
that in certain high-risk contexts, improved authentica-
tion methods should be employed. The FTC need not
necessarily choose which method. The test should be
pragmatic: How well does the method work? What are
the costs and benefits? The FTC can conclude that as
long as alternatives exist that are reasonable in cost and
ease of deployment, the use of passwords alone is insuf-
ficient.
In the most high-risk situations, the FTC can reach
the strong conclusion that the use of passwords alone
will not suffice. An example is the authentication of a
company’s employees who are accessing sensitive data
about consumers.
In other situations, the FTC might conclude that im-
proved authentication methods should be available or
strongly encouraged. An example would be requiring a
financial company to make available to consumers bet-
ter authentication methods. Ultimately, it would be up
to the consumers to choose. In some cases, the FTC
might promote a stronger requirement that the compa-
nies do more than merely make alternative authentica-
tion methods available but also more actively encour-
age their use. And it might be that for many low-risk ac-
counts, complex passwords and limitations on login
attempts are still sufficient.
Ultimately, the right amount of nudging versus push-
ing is a detail that can be worked out as this area of FTC
jurisprudence develops. The important point is that the
FTC intervene and take a stand. This will have an enor-
mous effect on industry, which looks to the FTC for
guidance and moves to respond to avoid being sub-
jected to FTC enforcement in the future.
Some might object that the FTC would be too aggres-
sive to start pushing improved authentication when
most companies still use passwords alone. Deference to
industry standards has been the hallmark of FTC’s ap-
proach to data security.40 However, there is a danger to
39 For a detailed exploration of the FTC’s interpretation of
proper password protocol, see Decision and Order at 2, In re
Twitter, Inc., FTC File No. 092 3093, No. C-4316 (F.T.C. Mar.
11, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/cases/2011/03/110311twitterdo.pdf (9 PVLR 934,
6/28/10); see also Complaint at 10-12, FTC v. WyndhamWorld-
wide Corp., No. 2:12-cv-01365-PGR (D. Ariz. filed Aug. 9,
2012) (detailing deficiencies in security measures), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/
08/120809wyndhamcmpt.pdf (11 PVLR 1069, 7/2/12); Com-
plaint at 9-11, FTC v. LifeLock, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-00530-MGM
(D. Ariz. filed Mar. 8, 2010) (same), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2010/03/
100309lifelockcmpt.pdf (9 PVLR 386, 3/15/10); Complaint, In
re Lookout Servs., Inc., 151 F.T.C. 532, 535 (2011) (same) (10
PVLR 694, 5/9/11); Complaint at 3-4, In re Reed Elsevier Inc.,
FTC File No. 052 3094, No. C-4226 (F.T.C. July 29, 2008)
(same), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/cases/2008/08/080801reedcomplaint.pdf (7 PVLR
1192, 8/11/08); Complaint at 2, In re TJX Cos., Inc., FTC File
No. 072 3055, No. C-4227, 2 (F.T.C. July 29, 2008) (same),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
cases/2008/08/080801tjxcomplaint.pdf (7 PVLR 1192, 8/11/08);
Complaint at 2, In re Guidance Software, Inc., FTC File No.
062 3057, No. C-4187 (F.T.C. Mar. 30, 2007) (same), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2007/
04/0623057complaint.pdf (5 PVLR 1586, 11/20/06)(5 PVLR
1586, 11/20/06); Complaint at 2, In re CardSystems Solutions,
Inc., FTC File No. 052 3148, No. C-4168 (F.T.C. Sept. 5, 2006)
(same), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/cases/2006/09/0523148cardsystemscomplaint.pdf
(5 PVLR 1307, 9/18/06); Complaint, In re BJ’s Wholesale Club,
Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465, 467 (2005) (same) (4 PVLR 789, 6/20/05).
40 Kristina Rozan, How Do Industry Standards for Data Se-
curity Match Up With the FTC’s Implied ‘‘Reasonable’’
Standards—And What Might This Mean for Liability
Avoidance? IAPP Privacy Advisor (Nov. 25, 2014), https://
privacyassociation.org/news/a/how-do-industry-standards-for-
data-security-match-up-with-the-ftcs-implied-reasonable-
standards-and-what-might-this-mean-for-liability-avoidance
(‘‘The industry standards for data security are more than just a
reference. Indeed, the commission has threatened to take ac-
tion against companies for ‘failure to abide by self-regulatory
programs they join.’ And according to the FTC, even if ‘you
don’t say anything specific about what you do with users’ in-
formation . . . Under the law, you still have to take reasonable
steps to keep sensitive data secure.’ Based on the comparison
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over-relying on what is considered reasonable accord-
ing to industry. Although deference to industry stan-
dards is important, it is not enough to simply enforce
only obvious and ubiquitous data security practices.
The FTC should push industry ahead in a reasonable
and pragmatic manner. It should look for security prob-
lems that are significant, and it should look to solutions
that have wide support.
Taking on passwords would affect an enormous num-
ber of companies, and the FTC might be nervous about
putting itself in a position of pushing against very com-
mon practices. But the common wisdom about pass-
words is clearly at odds with current practice. Thus, in
some ways such a move would actually be conservative,
as the FTC would be following widespread consensus.
Moreover, standards like the National Institute of
Standards and Technology’s Special Publication (SP)
800-53 and the International Organization for Stan-
dardization’s ISO 27001 help shape what the FTC con-
siders reasonable,41 and these standards require more
than mere passwords under certain circumstances.
NIST has issued authentication guidelines that articu-
late levels of assurances from 1-4, with assurance esca-
lating according to the level of risk.42 Level 3, the next
to highest level of authentication assurance, provides
multi-factor remote network authentication. The FTC
should more fully embrace this tiered approach for au-
thentication.
Of course the FTC should not be reckless in requir-
ing robust authentication. Cost and other consider-
ations might caution the agency from requiring stron-
ger authentication outside of contexts involving sensi-
tive data or workforce authentication. Such a broader
requirement might require more industry support and
adoption rates. But a bold first step for the FTC would
be to hold that companies must go beyond passwords
for workforce authentication when the data are sensi-
tive.
It is time to start moving beyond the password. The
FTC should not kill passwords, but it should not let
them continue their reign as the king of authentication.
The FTC should make passwords share their throne
with better forms of authentication.
made here, the industry standards are being used by the FTC
to decide what these ‘reasonable steps’ look like.’’).
41 Id.
42 NIST Special Publication 800-63-2, Electronic Authenti-
cation Guide (Aug. 2013), available at http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/
nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63-2.pdf.
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